

Exact Lattice-Based ZKP

Ngoc Khanh Nguyen



KING'S
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The logo for King's College London, featuring the text 'KING'S' in a large, white, serif font, 'College' in a smaller, white, italicized serif font, and 'LONDON' in a white, serif font below it, all set against a red rectangular background. Two horizontal white lines are positioned below the word 'LONDON'. The background of the entire slide is a photograph of a large, multi-story stone building at night, with many windows illuminated from within, creating a warm glow against the dark sky. Bare trees are visible in the foreground, and the building's architecture is classical, with many windows and a prominent entrance area.

So far...

Lattice-based cryptography

$$As = u$$

Denote
 $S_\beta := \{x \in R_q : \|x\| \leq \beta\}$

Vector \mathbf{s} has
polynomials with
small
coefficients
e.g. $\{-1, 0, 1\}$

Equation over
ring R_q

Approximate [Lyu09,Lyu12]:

- We only prove that we know short \mathbf{s} and short c such that $As = cu$.
- This is enough for identification schemes and signatures like CRYSTALS-Dilithium.
- Small proof sizes ($\approx 3KB$).

But we wanted more!

Lattice-based cryptography

$$As = u$$

Let us prove knowledge of such s !

Vector \mathbf{s} has
small
coefficients
e.g. $\{-1,0,1\}$

Equation over
ring \mathbb{Z}_q

Exact:

- We prove exactly that \mathbf{s} is within specified range and $As = u \pmod{q}$.
- This is crucial for building more advanced privacy-preserving primitives, e.g. verifiable encryption.
- Much bigger proof sizes.

The main focus of this talk: [LNP22] framework

$$As = u \pmod{q} \text{ and } \mathbf{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$$

Equation
over ring \mathbb{Z}_q

How many people are still following? 😊



Overview

$$As = \mathbf{u} \pmod{q}$$

$$\mathbf{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$$

Lemma: Let $s \in \mathbb{Z}^m$. Then, $s \in \{0,1\}^m$ if and only if $\langle s, s - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0$.

Proof: Suppose $\langle s, s - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0$. This means that

$$\sum_{i=1}^m s_i(s_i - 1) = 0.$$

However, since each s_i is an integer, we have


$$s_i(s_i - 1) \geq 0$$

Hence, the sum is equal to zero if each of the inequalities is an equality, i.e. $s_i \in \{0,1\}$.

Overview

$$As = \mathbf{u} \pmod{q}$$

$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0.$$



$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$$

and

$$\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll q$$

Overview

$$As = \mathbf{u} \pmod{q}$$

Linear proof

$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$$

Inner product
proof

$$\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll q$$

Approximate
range proof

How many people are still following? 😊



Overview

- If I take a random short vector \mathbf{b} , then clearly

$$\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s} \rangle$$


is short.

- But if I am given a large vector \mathbf{s} , then what's the probability that

$$\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s} \rangle$$

is short?

$$\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll q$$



Overview + ZK

- If I take a random short vector \mathbf{b} , add a short mask y then clearly

$$y + \langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s} \rangle$$


is short.

- But if I am given a large vector \mathbf{s} and y , then what's the probability that

$$y + \langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s} \rangle$$

is short?

$$\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll q$$



Approximate range proof lemma [BL17,LNS21]

Lemma:

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m} [|\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + y| < \frac{1}{2} \cdot \|\mathbf{s}\|] \leq 1/2.$$


Proof: Let $s_i = \|\mathbf{s}\|$ for some i .

Then, we can write $\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + y = b_i s_i + r$.

By the triangle inequality, **at least one** of $\{r, s_i + r\}$ has to have norm at least $\frac{1}{2} \cdot \|\mathbf{s}\|$.

The probability of hitting that value is at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

$$\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll q$$




Overview

Lemma:

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{B} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}} [\|\mathbf{B}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{y}\| < \frac{1}{2} \cdot \|\mathbf{s}\|] \leq 1/2^\lambda.$$

Proof: By amplification.

$$\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll q$$



Approximate
range proof

Intuition




$$s \in \{0,1\}^m$$

$$y \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$$

$$z = y + Bs$$

If $\|z\| > \alpha - m$, reject

$$\|s\| \ll q$$



y, s

B

z

Hence, the verifier is convinced that $\|s\| \leq 2\|y + Bs\| \leq 2(\alpha - m)$ (with high probability).

$$B \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$$

Check $\|z\| \leq \alpha - m$
 $z = y + Bs$

Commitments



Message m

$$t = Com(m; r)$$

Binding:

It's hard to find two different openings (m, r) and (m', r') such that $Com(m; r) = Com(m'; r')$.

Hiding:


The adversary can't learn any information about (m, r) from t

Attempt 2

$$\|s\| \ll q$$



$$s \in \{0,1\}^m$$



$$y \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$$
$$r \leftarrow \chi$$

$$t_y := \text{Com}(y; r), t_s := \text{Com}(s; r)$$



B



$$z = y + Bs$$

If $\|z\| > \alpha - m$, reject

z, y, s, r




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Check $\|z\| \leq \alpha - m$

$$z = y + Bs$$

$$t_y = \text{Com}(y; r), t_s = \text{Com}(s; r)$$

Attempt 2




Approximate range proof



$$s \in \{0,1\}^m$$

$$\|s\| \ll q$$



$$y \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$$
$$r \leftarrow \chi$$

$$t_y := \text{Com}(y; r), t_s := \text{Com}(s; r)$$

$$z = y + Bs$$

If $\|z\| > \alpha - m$, reject

$$B \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$$

B

z

Check $\|z\| \leq \alpha - m$

Prove knowledge
of y, s, r s.t.


$$t_y = \text{Com}(y; r)$$
$$t_s = \text{Com}(s; r)$$

$$z = y + Bs$$





Overview

$$As = u \pmod{q}$$




$$\langle s, s - 1 \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$$




$$t_y = \text{Com}(y; r) \quad z = y + Bs$$

$$t_s = \text{Com}(s; r)$$





Overview

$$As = u \pmod{q}$$



$$\langle s, s - 1 \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$$



$$t_y = \text{Com}(y; r) \quad z = y + Bs$$

$$t_s = \text{Com}(s; r)$$



How many people are still following? 😊



Next step: inner products over \mathbb{Z}_q

- We want to prove inner products (either between two committed messages, or between one secret and one public vector)
- Working natively over integers will result with bad soundness error (see previous lecture)
- We need to translate the inner products into relations over the polynomial ring R_q

$$R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(f(X))$$

- For concreteness, set $f(X) := X^d + 1$ for a power-of-two d

$$R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(f(X))$$

- For concreteness, set $f(X) := X^d + 1$ for a power-of-two d
- Let $a = a_0 + a_1X + \cdots + a_{d-1}X^{d-1} \in R_q$. Then $\|a\| = \max_i |a_i|$.
- Lemma: $\|ab\| \leq d \cdot \|a\| \cdot \|b\|$.

Setup

- For $i \in \mathbb{Z}_{2d}^\times$, let us denote $\sigma_i: R_q \mapsto R_q$ to be the automorphism defined by $\sigma_i(X) = X^i$.
- Let $\sigma := \sigma_{-1}$. Seems irrelevant now but it will be useful later!
- For $x \in R_q$, we denote $ct(x) = x_0$ its constant coefficient/term.

The key ingredient

Lemma: Let $u := \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i X^i$ and $v := \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} v_i X^i$ be ring elements in R_q . Then, the constant coefficient of the polynomial $u\sigma_{-1}(v) \in R_q$ is $\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i v_i$.

Proof: By definition,

$$\begin{aligned} u\sigma_{-1}(v) &= \left(\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i X^i \right) \sigma \left(\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} v_i X^i \right) \\ &= \left(\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i X^i \right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} v_i X^{-i} \right) = \sum_{i,j} u_i v_j X^{i-j}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the constant term is indeed $u_0 v_0 + u_1 v_1 + \cdots + u_{d-1} v_{d-1}$.

The key ingredient

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As an application of this lemma, we know a vector $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^d$ satisfies $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$ **if and only if**

$$ct \left(\left(s - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i \right) \cdot \sigma(s) \right) = 0$$

where $s := \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} s_i X^i$.

The key ingredient

Lemma: Let $u := \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i X^i$ and $v := \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} v_i X^i$ be ring elements in R_q . Then, the constant coefficient of the polynomial $u\sigma_{-1}(v) \in R_q$ is $\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i v_i$.

As an application of this lemma, we know a vector $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, \dots, s_{m/d}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ satisfies $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$ **if and only if**

$$ct \left(\sum_{j=1}^{m/d} \left(s_j - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i \right) \cdot \sigma(s_j) \right) = 0$$

where $s_j := \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} s_{j \cdot d + i} X^i$.


Back to overview

$$As = \mathbf{u} \pmod{q}$$




$$\forall i, ct(f_i(\mathbf{s})) = 0$$

$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$$



$$ct\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m/d} \left(s_j - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i\right) \cdot \sigma(s_j)\right) = 0$$



$$t_y = \text{Com}(y; r) \quad z = y + Bs$$


$$t_s = \text{Com}(s; r)$$




$$t_y = \text{Com}(y; r) \quad \forall i, ct(g_i(\mathbf{s}, y)) = 0$$

$$t_s = \text{Com}(s; r)$$

So far so good





How many people are still following? 😊

Proving constant coefficients

- We want to prove that $\forall i, ct(f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})) = 0$
- Clearly, for any $\mu_1, \dots, \mu_k \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ we have

$$ct\left(\sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})\right) = \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i \cdot ct(f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})) = 0.$$

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$$ct\left(\sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})\right) = \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i \cdot ct(f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})) = 0.$$

But what happens if for some $i, ct(f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})) \neq 0$?

Then, with prob. $\frac{1}{q}$, we have $ct\left(\sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})\right) = 0$. Repeat L times.

Adding zero-knowledge

- $\sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})$ potentially leaks information about \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}

Adding zero-knowledge

- $\sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})$ potentially leaks information about \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}
- Sample and commit to random polynomials $g_1, \dots, g_L \leftarrow \{x \in R_q : ct(x) = 0\}$.
- Given challenges $\mu_{j,1}, \dots, \mu_{j,k}$ for $j = 1, \dots, L$, compute


$$h_j := g_j + \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})$$

Hence, $ct(h_j) = 0$ and h_j hides info about other coeffs of $\sum_{i=1}^k \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{t}_y &= \text{Com}(\mathbf{y}; \mathbf{r}) \\
 \mathbf{t}_s &= \text{Com}(\mathbf{s}; \mathbf{r}) \quad \forall i, ct(f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$



\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}



$$g_1, \dots, g_L \leftarrow \{x \in R_q : ct(x) = 0\}$$

$$\mathbf{t}_g := \text{Com}(\mathbf{g}; \mathbf{r})$$

$$(\mu_{j,i})_{j,i}$$


$$(\mu_{j,i})_{j,i} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{L \times k}$$

$$\forall j, h_j := g_j + \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y})$$

$$h_1, \dots, h_L$$

Check $\forall j, ct(h_j) = 0$

Overview




$$t_y = Com(y; r)$$

$$t_s = Com(s; r)$$

$$t_g := Com(g; r)$$

$$\forall j, h_j = g_j + \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_i(s, y)$$

In other words



$t_y = Com(y; r)$
 $t_s = Com(s; r)$

$t_g := Com(g; r)$

$\forall j, P_j(s, y, g) = 0$


Public quadratic function (with σ)

How many people are still following? 😊




Simple amortisation

$$\begin{aligned} t_y &= \text{Com}(\mathbf{y}; \mathbf{r}) \\ t_s &= \text{Com}(\mathbf{s}; \mathbf{r}) \quad \forall j, P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = 0 \\ t_g &:= \text{Com}(\mathbf{g}; \mathbf{r}) \end{aligned}$$



\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}



η_1, \dots, η_L

$\eta_i \leftarrow R_q^L$

Prove that:

$$\sum_{j=1}^L \eta_j \cdot P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = 0$$

Soundness analysis


- What's the probability that $\sum_{j=1}^L \eta_j \cdot P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = 0$ if for some j , $P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) \neq 0$?
- Consider the standard polynomial ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ where d is a power-of-two and $q = 5 \pmod{8}$.

Soundness analysis

- What's the probability that $\sum_{j=1}^L \eta_j \cdot P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = 0$ if for some j , $P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) \neq 0$?
- Consider the standard polynomial ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ where d is a power-of-two and $q = 5 \pmod{8}$.
- Then, $X^d + 1 = (X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r)(X^{\frac{d}{2}} + r)$ factors into two irreducible polynomials modulo q .
- By CRT, R_q is isomorphic to $\frac{\mathbb{Z}[X]}{\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r, q\right)} \times \frac{\mathbb{Z}[X]}{\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} + r, q\right)}$.

Soundness analysis

- What's the probability that $\sum_{j=1}^L \eta_j \cdot P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = 0$ if for some j , $P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) \neq 0$?
- Consider the standard polynomial ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ where d is a power-of-two and $q = 5 \pmod{8}$.
- Then, $X^d + 1 = (X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r)(X^{\frac{d}{2}} + r)$ factors into two irreducible polynomials modulo q .
- By CRT, R_q is isomorphic to $\frac{\mathbb{Z}[X]}{\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r, q\right)} \times \frac{\mathbb{Z}[X]}{\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} + r, q\right)}$.
- Hence the probability that $\eta_j \cdot P_j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = x$ is at most $2q^{-d/2}$.



$t_y = Com(y; r)$
 $t_s = Com(s; r)$
 $\forall i, ct(f_i(s, y)) = 0$

where f_i are public quadratic functions (with σ)

Public quadratic function (with σ)

$t_y = Com(y; r)$
 $t_s = Com(s; r)$

$t_g := Com(g; r)$

$\forall j, P_j(s, y, g) = 0$

$t_y = Com(y; r)$
 $t_s = Com(s; r)$


$t_g := Com(g; r)$

$Q(s, y, g) = 0$

How many people are still following? 😊




I can only do handwaving thus far



ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

- Suppose we want to commit to a polynomial vector $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{m}) \in R_q^{m_1+l}$ where \mathbf{s}_1 has small norm (but not necessarily \mathbf{m}).



We could treat $\mathbf{s}_1 := s$
and $\mathbf{m} := (y, g)$.

ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

- Suppose we want to commit to a polynomial vector $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{m}) \in R_q^{m_1+l}$ where \mathbf{s}_1 has small norm (but not necessarily \mathbf{m}).
- The ABDLOP commitment under randomness $\mathbf{s}_2 \in R_q^{m_2}$ is defined as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{t}_A \\ \mathbf{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A}_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A}_2 \\ \mathbf{B} \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{m} \end{bmatrix}.$$

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If $l = 0$ then ABDLOP = Ajtai commitment.

If $m_1 = 0$ then ABDLOP = BDLOP commitment.

ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

- Suppose we want to commit to a polynomial vector $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{m}) \in R_q^{m_1+l}$ where \mathbf{s}_1 has small norm (but not necessarily \mathbf{m}).
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Security:

Breaking binding implies finding a MSIS solution to $[\mathbf{A}_1 \ \mathbf{A}_2]$.

ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

- Suppose we want to commit to a polynomial vector $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{m}) \in R_q^{m_1+l}$ where \mathbf{s}_1 has small norm (but not necessarily \mathbf{m}).
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Security:


Hiding follows from MLWE since $\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A}_2 \\ \mathbf{B} \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{s}_2$ looks uniformly random (for long enough randomness)

ABDLOP opening proof

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } s_1, s_2 \text{ have small coefficients}$$



$(A_1, A_2, B, t_A, t_B), (s_1, s_2, m)$



(A_1, A_2, B, t_A, t_B)

$$y_i \leftarrow D^{m_i}$$

w

$$w = A_1 y_1 + A_2 y_2$$

c

$$c \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$$

$$z_i = y_i + c s_i$$

z_1, z_2

Check: i) z_1, z_2 are small
ii) $A_1 z_1 + A_2 z_2 = w + c t_A$

How many people are still following? 😊



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{m} = \mathbf{0}$.

Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \end{bmatrix}$$

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ABDLOP opening
proof

w



c



$$z_i = y_i + c s_i$$



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Note that the verifier can compute

$$\mathbf{z}_1^T \mathbf{z}_1 = \mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{y}_1 + 2c \mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + c^2 \mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1$$

ABDLOP opening
proof

w



c



$$\mathbf{z}_i = \mathbf{y}_i + c \mathbf{s}_i$$



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $s_1^T s_1 + m^T m = \mathbf{0}$.

ABDLOP opening
proof

Note that the verifier can compute

$$z_1^T z_1 = y_1^T y_1 + 2c y_1^T s_1 + c^2 s_1^T s_1$$

Moreover, we know $ct_B - Bz_2 = -By_2 + cm$.


Thus:

$$\begin{aligned} (ct_B - Bz_2)^T (ct_B - Bz_2) \\ = (By_2)^T By_2 - 2c(By_2)^T m + c^2 m^T m \end{aligned}$$


w



c



$z_i = y_i + cs_i$



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{m} = \mathbf{0}$.

ABDLOP opening
proof

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{z}_1^T \mathbf{z}_1 + (c t_B - B \mathbf{z}_2)^T (c t_B - B \mathbf{z}_2) \\ = g_0 + c g_1 + c^2 (\mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{m}) \end{aligned}$$


where

$$\begin{aligned} g_0 &= \mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{y}_1 + (B \mathbf{y}_2)^T B \mathbf{y}_2 \\ g_1 &= 2 \mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 - 2 (B \mathbf{y}_2)^T \mathbf{m}. \end{aligned}$$


\mathbf{w}



c



$\mathbf{z}_i = \mathbf{y}_i + c \mathbf{s}_i$



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \\ t_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ \mathbf{B} \\ b_1^T \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{m} \\ g_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{m} = \mathbf{0}$.

ABDLOP opening
proof

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{z}_1^T \mathbf{z}_1 + (c t_B - \mathbf{B} \mathbf{z}_2)^T (c t_B - \mathbf{B} \mathbf{z}_2) \\ = g_0 + c g_1 + c^2 (\mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{m}) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} g_0 &= \mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{y}_1 + (\mathbf{B} \mathbf{y}_2)^T \mathbf{B} \mathbf{y}_2 \\ g_1 &= 2 \mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 - 2 (\mathbf{B} \mathbf{y}_2)^T \mathbf{m}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, commit to $t_1 := \mathbf{b}_0^T \mathbf{s}_2 + g_1$.

\mathbf{w}



c



$$\mathbf{z}_i = \mathbf{y}_i + c \mathbf{s}_i$$



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \\ t_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ \mathbf{B} \\ b_1^T \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{m} \\ g_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we

Appending the ABDLOP
commitment

$$n^T m = \mathbf{0}.$$

ABDLOP opening
proof

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} z_1^T z_1 + (c t_B - \mathbf{B} z_2)^T (c t_B - \mathbf{B} z_2) \\ = g_0 + c g_1 + c^2 (s_1^T s_1 + m^T m) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} g_0 &= y_1^T y_1 + (\mathbf{B} y_2)^T \mathbf{B} y_2 \\ g_1 &= 2 y_1^T s_1 - 2 (\mathbf{B} y_2)^T m. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, commit to $t_1 := b_0^T s_2 + g_1$.

w

c

$$z_i = y_i + c s_i$$

Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \\ t_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ \mathbf{B} \\ b_1^T \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{m} \\ g_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{m} = \mathbf{0}$.
- $\mathbf{z}_1^T \mathbf{z}_1 + (ct_B - \mathbf{Bz}_2)^T (ct_B - \mathbf{Bz}_2) - (ct_1 - \mathbf{b}_1^T \mathbf{z}_2)$
$$= g_0 + cg_1 - (ct_1 - \mathbf{b}_1^T \mathbf{z}_2)$$
$$= g_0 + \mathbf{b}_1^T \mathbf{y}_2$$

where the right-hand side does not depend on c .

ABDLOP opening
proof

w



c




$$\mathbf{z}_i = \mathbf{y}_i + c\mathbf{s}_i$$



Proving $\mathbf{s}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{m} = 0$.



$(A_1, A_2, B, t_A, t_B), (\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2, \mathbf{m})$



(A_1, A_2, B, t_A, t_B)

$$y_i \leftarrow D^{m_i}$$

$$\mathbf{w} = A_1 \mathbf{y}_1 + A_2 \mathbf{y}_2$$

$$g_1 = 2\mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{s}_1 - 2(\mathbf{B}\mathbf{y}_2)^T \mathbf{m}$$

$$t_1 := \mathbf{b}_1^T \mathbf{s}_2 + g_1$$

$$v := \mathbf{y}_1^T \mathbf{y}_1 + (\mathbf{B}\mathbf{y}_2)^T \mathbf{B}\mathbf{y}_2 + \mathbf{b}_1^T \mathbf{y}_2$$

\mathbf{w}, t_1, v

c

$\mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2$

$c \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$

$$\mathbf{z}_i = \mathbf{y}_i + c\mathbf{s}_i$$

Check: - $\mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2$ are small
 - $A_1 \mathbf{z}_1 + A_2 \mathbf{z}_2 = \mathbf{w} + ct_A$
 - and:

$$\mathbf{z}_1^T \mathbf{z}_1 + (ct_B - \mathbf{B}\mathbf{z}_2)^T (ct_B - \mathbf{B}\mathbf{z}_2) - (ct_1 - \mathbf{b}_1^T \mathbf{z}_2) = v$$

How many people are still following? 😊



Quadratic equations with automorphism

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to mix quadratic equations with automorphisms, e.g.

$$\mathbf{s}_1^T \sigma(\mathbf{s}_1) + \mathbf{m}^T \sigma(\mathbf{m}) = \mathbf{0}.$$

If we assume that each challenge $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is stable under the σ automorphism, then one can prove the statement as before!

ABDLOP opening proof

w



c



$$\mathbf{z}_i = \mathbf{y}_i + c\mathbf{s}_i$$



Quadratic equations with automorphism

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to mix quadratic equations with automorphisms, e.g.

$$s_1^T \sigma(s_1) + m^T \sigma(m) = \mathbf{0}.$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} z_1^T \sigma(z_1) + (ct_B - Bz_2)^T \sigma(ct_B - Bz_2) \\ = g_0 + cg_1 + c^2 (s_1^T \sigma(s_1) + m^T \sigma(m)) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} g_0 &= y_1^T \sigma(y_1) + (By_2)^T \sigma(By_2) \\ g_1 &= y_1^T \sigma(s_1) + \sigma(y_1^T) s_1 - \sigma(By_2)^T m - (By_2)^T \sigma(m). \end{aligned}$$

ABDLOP opening
proof

w



c



$$z_i = y_i + cs_i$$



Quadratic equations with automorphism

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- Suppose we want to mix quadratic equations with automorphisms, e.g.

$$s_1^T \sigma(s_1) + m^T \sigma(m)$$

We assumed $\sigma(c) = c$.

Then,

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$$\begin{aligned} g_0 &= y_1^T \sigma(y_1) + (By_2)^T \sigma(By_2) \\ g_1 &= y_1^T \sigma(s_1) + \sigma(y_1^T) s_1 - \sigma(By_2)^T m - (By_2)^T \sigma(m). \end{aligned}$$

ABDLOP opening proof

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c



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Challenge space

- We need exponentially large challenge space \mathcal{C} .
- We want $\sigma(c) = c$ for any $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
- We want the difference of any distinct $c, c' \in \mathcal{C}$ to be invertible over R_q .

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Let us pick:

$$\mathcal{C} = \{c_0 + c_1X + \dots + c_{\frac{d}{2}-1}X^{\frac{d}{2}-1} - c_{\frac{d}{2}-1}X^{\frac{d}{2}+1} - \dots - c_1X^{d-1} : c_i \in [-\kappa, \kappa]\}.$$

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$$|\mathcal{C}| = (2\kappa + 1)^{d/2}.$$

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Lemma: Suppose $q \equiv 5 \pmod{8}$. If $\sigma_{-1}(c) = c$ and c is non-zero, then c is invertible over R_q .

How many people are still following? 😊



Soundness analysis

- Since the verification equation is a “quadratic equation”, we actually need to extract **three** transcripts $(\mathbf{w}, c, \mathbf{z}), (\mathbf{w}, c', \mathbf{z}'), (\mathbf{w}, c'', \mathbf{z}'')$ with pairwise different $c, c', c'' \in \mathcal{C}$.
- (Relaxed) Binding from SIS
- Interpolation approach to prove quadratic equations

We only extract $(\mathbf{s}_1^*, \mathbf{s}_2^*, c^*)$ s.t. $\mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{s}_1^* + \mathbf{A}_2 \mathbf{s}_2^* = c^* \mathbf{u} \pmod{q}$,
 $\mathbf{s}_1^*, \mathbf{s}_2^*, c^*$ - short.

Lemma: Suppose there are two $(\mathbf{s}_1^*, \mathbf{s}_2^*, c^*)$ and $(\mathbf{s}'_1, \mathbf{s}'_2, c')$ which satisfy the above. Then, under the Module-SIS assumption,

$$\mathbf{s}_1 := \frac{\mathbf{s}_1^*}{c^*} = \frac{\mathbf{s}'_1}{c'} \text{ and } \mathbf{s}_2 := \frac{\mathbf{s}_2^*}{c^*} = \frac{\mathbf{s}'_2}{c'}$$

Candidate
witness

Proof sketch:

$$\mathbf{0} = c^* c' \mathbf{u} - c' c^* \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}_1 (c^* \mathbf{s}'_1 - c' \mathbf{s}_1^*) + \mathbf{A}_2 (c^* \mathbf{s}'_2 - c' \mathbf{s}_2^*)$$

Short!

Soundness analysis

- Since the verification equation is a “quadratic equation”, we actually need to extract **three** transcripts $(\mathbf{w}, c, \mathbf{z}), (\mathbf{w}, c', \mathbf{z}'), (\mathbf{w}, c'', \mathbf{z}'')$ with pairwise different $c, c', c'' \in \mathcal{C}$.
- (Relaxed) Binding from SIS
- Interpolation approach to prove quadratic equations
- We extract a **candidate** witness $\mathbf{s}_i := \mathbf{s}_i^*/c^*$ (division of two short elements) and \mathbf{m} , s.t. $\mathbf{A}_1\mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2\mathbf{s}_2 = \mathbf{t}_A$ and $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{s}_2 + \mathbf{m} = \mathbf{t}_B$.

Extraction - meaning

- From the opening proof, we obtain a **candidate witness s** , it could be large (but relaxed binding holds)

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$$A\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{u} \pmod{q} \quad \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}$$

- Approximate range proof makes sure that $\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll q$, and we are done.

Which d to pick - tradeoff

- We want d to be large enough, so that the challenge space is exponential-size

- We want d to be as small as possible, since sending ring elements will be costly


Challenge space

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How many people are still following? 😊



Efficiency and applications



Applications


- Proving knowledge of short \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e} s.t. $\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{u}$.

Scheme	Proof size
Stern proofs (e.g. [Ste93,LNSW13])	3MB
[Beu20]	233KB
[BLS19,YAZ+19]	384KB
Ligero [AHIV17]	157KB
Aurora [BCR+19,BCOS20]	72KB
MPC-in-the-head approach [FR23]	22-60KB
[ALS20,ENS20]	47KB
[LNS21]	33KB
[LNP22]	14KB

What about SNARKs?

LaBRADOR [BS23]

Succinct proof sizes (60KB) but, non-succinct verification!



Approximate range proof



$$s \in \{0,1\}^m$$

$$\|s\| \ll q$$

$$y \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$$
$$r \leftarrow \chi$$

$$t_y := \text{Com}(y; r), t_s := \text{Com}(s; r)$$



$$B \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$$

$$z = y + Bs$$

B

z

If $\|z\| > \alpha - m$, reject

Check $\|z\| \leq \alpha - m$


Prove knowledge
of y, s, r s.t.

$$t_y = \text{Com}(y; r)$$
$$t_s = \text{Com}(s; r)$$

$$z = y + Bs$$



Linear-sized matrix B



How to achieve sublinear verification with ARP

- Use a structured tensor-type matrix \mathbf{B} [CMNW24]
- Use LaBRADOR as a subroutine [NS24]
- Just don't use ARP (and deal with its consequences – **next talk**)



Summary

- Linear-sized efficient “exact” ZKP from lattices
 - Under standard assumptions: MSIS and MLWE
 - Transparent setup
 - Sizes: \approx 15KB
 - Can be made non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir transformation
- “Approximate” proofs more efficient and have some applications

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/284>



Thank you!

References

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