


Group Based SNARKs

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Lectures 1,2,3



- $(\mathbb{G}, +)$ group of prime order p ;
- (Algebraic) proof systems where DLOG problem is hard;

$$\Pr(x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, H) \wedge H = x\mathcal{P} \mid x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*) \approx 0$$

- Lecture 1: techniques in groups without efficiently computable bilinear maps/pairings;
- Lecture 2: techniques in groups with efficiently computable pairings
- Lecture 3: Polynomial Commitments in pairing groups

Organization

- Commitments

- Bulletproofs

- Accumulators

Commitments

Algebraic Commitments

Pedersen Vector Commitments

$(\mathbb{G}, +)$ group of prime order p .

- $ck \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\mathbb{G}, n)$: sample $ck = \vec{G} = (G_1, \dots, G_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ from some distribution \mathcal{D}_n .
- $C \leftarrow \text{Commit}(ck \in \mathbb{G}^n, \vec{m} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n)$:

$$\begin{cases} ck = \vec{G} = (G_1, \dots, G_n) \\ (m_1, \dots, m_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \end{cases} \quad \longrightarrow \quad C = \langle \vec{m}, \vec{G} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i G_i$$

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Binding: If adversary finds one commitment and two valid openings C, \vec{m}, \vec{m}' then:

$$\begin{cases} C = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i G_i \\ C = \sum_{i=1}^n m'_i G_i \end{cases} \quad \implies \quad \mathcal{O} = \langle \vec{m} - \vec{m}', \vec{G} \rangle$$

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\mathcal{D}_n -FINDREP problem (also kernel problem, or discrete log relations):

$$\Pr(\vec{v} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\vec{G}) \wedge \mathcal{O} = \langle \vec{v}, \vec{G} \rangle \mid \vec{G} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_n) \approx 0$$

Algebraic Commitments

Pedersen Vector Commitments

$(\mathbb{G}, +)$ group of prime order p .

■ **Example 1:** Uniform Key, transparent setup, $\mathcal{D}_n = \mathcal{U}_n$.

$\text{ck} = \vec{G} = (G_1, \dots, G_n)$, G_i uniformly and independently chosen from \mathbb{G}

Binding Ex1: $\text{DLOG} \xrightarrow{\text{tight}} \mathcal{U}_n - \text{FINDREP}$.

Algebraic Commitments


Pedersen Vector Commitments

$(G, +)$ group of prime order p .

■ **Example 1:** Uniform Key, transparent setup, $\mathcal{D}_n = \mathcal{U}_n$.

$ck = \vec{G} = (G_1, \dots, G_n)$, G_i uniformly and independently chosen from G

Binding Ex1: $DLOG \xrightarrow{\text{tight}} \mathcal{U}_n - \text{FINDREP}$.



$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Proof}}{0} = \langle \vec{v}, \vec{G} \rangle &= \langle \vec{v}, \vec{a} \rangle P + \langle \vec{v}, \vec{b} \rangle H \\ &\stackrel{(*)}{\Rightarrow} \frac{\langle \vec{v}, \vec{a} \rangle}{\langle \vec{v}, \vec{b} \rangle} P = H. \end{aligned}$$


Algebraic Commitments

Pedersen Vector Commitments

- **Example 1:** Uniform Key, transparent setup, $\mathcal{D}_n = \mathcal{U}_n$.

$ck = \vec{G} = (G_1, \dots, G_n)$, G_i uniformly and independently chosen from \mathbb{G}

Binding Ex1: $\text{DLOG} \xrightarrow{\text{tight}} \mathcal{U}_n - \text{FINDREP}$.



$$\text{Proof} \quad \frac{0}{0} = \langle \vec{v}, \vec{G} \rangle = \langle \vec{v}, \vec{a} \rangle P + \langle \vec{v}, \vec{b} \rangle H$$

$$\stackrel{(*)}{\Rightarrow} \frac{\langle \vec{v}, \vec{a} \rangle}{\langle \vec{v}, \vec{b} \rangle} P = H$$

except with probability $\frac{1}{|p|}$

Important Technique:
hide challenge information
theoretically in variables

Algebraic Commitments

Pedersen Vector Commitments

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- **Example 1:** Uniform Key, transparent setup, $\mathcal{D}_n = \mathcal{U}_n$.

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Binding Ex1: DLOG Assumption $\xrightarrow{\text{tight}} \mathcal{U}_n$ – FINDREP (\Leftarrow is trivial).

- **Example 2:** Structured Setup (powers of trapdoor)

$\text{ck} = \vec{G} = (\mathcal{P}, x\mathcal{P}, \dots, x^n\mathcal{P}), G_i = x^i G, x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$

- **Example 3:** Structured Setup, $n = 2^\mu$ (multilinear monomials of μ variables)

$\text{ck} = \vec{G} = (\mathcal{P}, x_1\mathcal{P}, x_2\mathcal{P}, \dots, x_\mu\mathcal{P}, x_1x_2\mathcal{P}, \dots, x_1x_2 \dots x_\mu\mathcal{P})$

Algebraic Commitments

Pedersen Vector Commitments

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Binding Ex 2,3 : n – DLOG $\xrightarrow{\text{tight}} \mathcal{D}_n$ – FINDREP.

n – DLOG Assumption : $\Pr(x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, x\mathcal{P}, \dots, x^n\mathcal{P}) \mid x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*) \approx 0$

Algebraic Commitments

Pedersen Vector Commitments

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1) **Uniform Key: weaker assumptions!**

Algebraic Commitments

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$$\text{ck} = \vec{G} = (G_1, \dots, G_n), G_i \text{ uniformly and independently chosen from } \mathbb{G}$$

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- 1) **Uniform Key:** weaker assumptions!
- 2) **Uniform Key:** Trapdoors unknown to any party through oblivious sampling, $H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$
- 3) **Functionality ?**

Bulletproofs

Bulletproofs

BP is an Inner Product Argument

■ $(\mathbb{G}, +)$ group of prime order p . $\vec{G}, \vec{H} \in \mathbb{G}^n$ commitment keys;

■ Statement:

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} C \in \mathbb{G} \text{ is a commitment to } \vec{a} \text{ with key } \vec{G} \\ \text{and} \\ D \in \mathbb{G} \text{ is a commitment to } \vec{b} \text{ with key } \vec{H} \\ \text{and} \\ \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}_p \text{ is the inner product of committed values } \vec{a}, \vec{b}. \end{array} \right.$

i.e. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} C = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle \\ \text{and} \\ D = \langle \vec{b}, \vec{H} \rangle \\ \text{and} \\ \sigma = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{b} \rangle. \end{array} \right.$

Witness: \vec{a}, \vec{b} .

Bulletproofs

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Witness: \vec{a}, \vec{b} .

- Recursive Strategy: Reduce to a randomized statement of half the size:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} C' = \langle \vec{a}', \vec{G}' \rangle \\ \text{and} \\ D' = \langle \vec{b}', \vec{H}' \rangle \\ \text{and} \\ \sigma' = \langle \vec{a}', \vec{b}' \rangle , \end{array} \right.$$

$\vec{a}', \vec{b}' \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n/2}$, $\vec{G}', \vec{H}' \in \mathbb{G}_p^{n/2}$. Repeat until length 1, then open and check.

Bulletproofs Recursive Strategy I

Simple Facts

■ **Simple Fact 1:** $\vec{a} = (\vec{a}_L, \vec{a}_R)$, $\vec{G} = (\vec{G}_L, \vec{G}_R)$,

$$C = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle = \langle \vec{a}_L, \vec{G}_L \rangle + \langle \vec{a}_R, \vec{G}_R \rangle .$$

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■ **Simple Fact 2:** Let $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$\text{If } \begin{cases} \vec{a}' = \vec{a}_L + \alpha \vec{a}_R \\ \vec{G}' = \vec{G}_L + \alpha^{-1} \vec{G}_R \end{cases} \quad \text{then } \langle \vec{a}', \vec{G}' \rangle = C + \alpha C_{RL} + \alpha^{-1} C_{LR}$$

Proof:

$$\langle \vec{a}', \vec{G}' \rangle = \langle \vec{a}_L, \vec{G}_L \rangle + \alpha \alpha^{-1} \langle \vec{a}_R, \vec{G}_R \rangle + \alpha \langle \vec{a}_R, \vec{G}_L \rangle + \alpha^{-1} \langle \vec{a}_L, \vec{G}_R \rangle$$

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Proof:

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■ **Simple Fact 3:** Let $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$, $C = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle$, $D = \langle \vec{H}, \vec{b} \rangle$, $\sigma = \langle a, b \rangle$.

$$\text{If } \begin{cases} \vec{a}' = \vec{a}_L + \alpha \vec{a}_R \\ \vec{H}' = \vec{H}_L + \alpha \vec{H}_R \\ \vec{G}' = \vec{G}_L + \alpha^{-1} \vec{G}_R \\ \vec{b}' = \vec{b}_L + \alpha^{-1} \vec{b}_R \end{cases} \quad \text{then: } \begin{cases} \langle \vec{a}', \vec{G}' \rangle = C + \alpha C_{RL} + \alpha^{-1} C_{LR} = \vec{C}' \\ \langle \vec{H}', \vec{b}' \rangle = D + \alpha D_{RL} + \alpha^{-1} D_{LR} = \vec{D}' \\ \langle a', b' \rangle = \sigma + \alpha \sigma_{RL} + \alpha^{-1} \sigma_{LR} = \sigma' \end{cases}$$

Bulletproofs Recursive Strategy II

Split and Combine: From Commitments Size n to Commitments size $n/2$

■ **Simple Fact 2:** Let $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$\text{If } \begin{cases} \vec{a}' = \vec{a}_L + \alpha \vec{a}_R \\ \vec{G}' = \vec{G}_L + \alpha^{-1} \vec{G}_R \end{cases} \quad \text{then } \langle \vec{a}', \vec{G}' \rangle = C + \alpha C_{RL} + \alpha^{-1} C_{LR}$$

Split and Combine Protocol:

Statement: C is s.t

$$C = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle$$

witness: a

P

$$\xrightarrow{C, C_{RL}, C_{LR}}$$

V

α

$$\xleftarrow{\hspace{10em}}$$

Statement: C' is s.t

$$C' = C + \alpha C_{RL} + \alpha^{-1} C_{LR} = \langle \vec{a}', \vec{G}' \rangle$$

witness: $\vec{a}' = \vec{a}_L + \alpha \vec{a}_R$

Bulletproofs Full Protocol

$$C = \langle (a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3), (G_0, G_1, G_2, G_3) \rangle$$

\uparrow \uparrow
 \mathbb{Z}_p^4 \mathbb{G}^4

$$C_{LR} = \langle (a_0, a_1), (G_2, G_3) \rangle$$

$$C_{RL} = \langle (a_2, a_3), (G_0, G_1) \rangle$$

$$\vec{a}^{(1)} = \vec{a}_L + \alpha_1 \vec{a}_R \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$$

$$\vec{G}^{(1)} = \vec{G}_L + \alpha_1^{-1} \vec{G}_R \in \mathbb{G}^2$$

$$C_{LR}^{(1)} = \langle a_0^{(1)}, G_1^{(1)} \rangle$$

$$C_{RL}^{(1)} = \langle a_1^{(1)}, G_0^{(1)} \rangle$$

$$\vec{a}^{(2)} = \vec{a}_L + \alpha_2 \vec{a}_R \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$\vec{G}^{(2)} = \vec{G}_L + \alpha_2^{-1} \vec{G}_R \in \mathbb{G}$$

$$\xrightarrow{C_{LR}, C_{RL}}$$

$$\xleftarrow{\alpha_1} C^{(1)} = C + \alpha_1 C_{RL} + \alpha_1^{-1} C_{LR}$$

$$\xrightarrow{C_{LR}^{(1)}, C_{RL}^{(1)}}$$

$$\xleftarrow{\alpha_2} C^{(2)} = C^{(1)} + \alpha_2 C_{RL}^{(1)} + \alpha_2^{-1} C_{LR}^{(1)}$$

$$\xrightarrow{a^{(2)}, G^{(2)}} C^{(2)} \stackrel{?}{=} \langle a^{(2)}, G^{(2)} \rangle \wedge G^{(2)} \text{ is CORRECT}$$

\uparrow \uparrow
 \mathbb{Z}_p \mathbb{G}

Bulletproofs: Soundness

Algebraic Reductions of Knowledge

- Idea: if adversary knows opening for $C^{(i+1)}$ w.r.t to key $\vec{G}^{(i+1)}$, then it knows an opening for $C^{(i)}$ w.r.t to key $\vec{G}^{(i)}$.

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{C_{LR}^{(1)} \quad C_{RL}^{(1)}}{\quad} \\
 \\
 \begin{array}{l}
 \vec{a}^{(2)} = \vec{a}_L^{(1)} + \alpha_2 \vec{a}_R^{(1)} \in \mathbb{Z}_p \\
 \vec{G}^{(2)} = \vec{G}_L^{(1)} + \alpha_2^{-1} \vec{G}_R^{(1)} \in \mathbb{G}
 \end{array}
 \end{array}
 \xleftarrow{\alpha_2}
 C^{(2)} = C^{(1)} + \alpha_2 C_{RL}^{(1)} + \alpha_2^{-1} C_{LR}^{(1)}$$

$\xrightarrow{\alpha^{(2)}} C^{(2)} \stackrel{?}{=} \langle \underbrace{a^{(2)}}_{\mathbb{Z}_p}, \underbrace{G^{(2)}}_{\mathbb{G}} \rangle$

} }
 Rewind $\times 3$

$$a^{(2,i)} G^{(2,i)} = C^{(1)} + \alpha_i C_{RL}^{(1)} + \alpha_i^{-1} C_{LR}^{(1)}$$

$i = 1, 2, 3.$

\Downarrow GAUSS

$$\vec{a}^{(1)} = (a_0, a_1) \text{ s.t. } C^1 = \langle \vec{a}^{(1)}, \vec{G}^{(1)} \rangle$$

Polynomial Commitments in DLOG Groups

Polynomial commitments from BP

- $C \leftarrow \text{PolyCommit}(\text{ck} \in \mathbb{G}^n, \vec{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n)$:

$$\begin{cases} \text{ck} = \vec{G} = (G_1, \dots, G_n) \\ (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \end{cases} \longrightarrow C = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i G_i$$

- $\pi, f(s) \leftarrow \text{PolyCommitOpen}(\text{ck} \in \mathbb{G}^n, \vec{c} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n, s \in \mathbb{Z}_p)$: if \vec{a} are the coefficients of polynomial $f(X)$, return $f(s)$, and short proof of correct opening π .

Polynomial commitments from BP

- $C \leftarrow \text{PolyCommit}(\text{ck} \in \mathbb{G}^n, \vec{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n)$:

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$$\begin{cases} C = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle \\ D = \langle \vec{H}, \vec{s} \rangle \\ f(s) = \langle \vec{a}, (1, s, s^2, \dots, s^{n-1}) \rangle \end{cases}$$

PolyCommitOpen Statement

Polynomial commitments from BP

- $C \leftarrow \text{PolyCommit}(\text{ck} \in \mathbb{G}^n, \vec{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n)$:

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$$\begin{cases} C = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle \\ \cancel{D = \langle \vec{H}, \vec{s} \rangle} \longrightarrow s \\ f(s) = \langle \vec{a}, (1, s, s^2, \dots, s^{n-1}) \rangle \end{cases}$$

PolyCommitOpen Statement

Bulletproofs: Efficiency

- Prover Complexity: $O(n)$
- Communication Complexity: $O(\log n)$.
- Verifier Complexity:

Bulletproofs: Efficiency

- Prover Complexity: $O(n)$
- Communication Complexity: $O(\log n)$.
- Verifier Complexity: $O(n)$

$$\vec{G} = (G_0, G_1, G_2, G_3) \in \mathbb{G}^4$$

$$\vec{G}^{(1)} = (G_0 + \alpha_1^{-1}G_2, G_1 + \alpha_1^{-1}G_3) \in \mathbb{G}^2$$

$$\vec{G}^{(2)} = G_0 + \alpha_1^{-1}G_2 + \alpha_2^{-1}G_1 + \alpha_2^{-1}\alpha_1^{-1}G_3 \in \mathbb{G}$$

$$= G_0 + \alpha_2^{-1}G_1 + \alpha_1^{-1}G_2 + \alpha_2^{-1}\alpha_1^{-1}G_3$$

$$= \langle \vec{G}, (1, \alpha_1^{-1}) \otimes (1, \alpha_2^{-1}) \rangle$$

$$= \text{PolyCommit}_{\vec{G}}(g)$$

where $g(X) = (1 + \alpha_1^{-1}X^2)(1 + \alpha_2^{-1}X) = 1 + \alpha_2^{-1}X + \alpha_1^{-1}X^2 + \alpha_2^{-1}\alpha_1^{-1}X^3$.

Accumulators

Bulletproofs: Efficiency


- Prover Complexity: $O(n)$
- Communication Complexity: $O(\log_2 n)$.
- Verifier Complexity: $O(n)$ **IT'S A SAD, SAD, WORLD**

More generally, if $n = 2^\mu$,

$$\vec{G}^{(\mu)} = \langle \vec{G}, \bigotimes (1, \alpha_i^{-1}) \rangle = \text{PolyCommit}_{\vec{G}}(\vec{c})$$

where $g(X) = \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (1 + \alpha_{\mu+1-i}^{-1} X^{2^{i-1}})$.

Bulletproofs: Split Verifiers



- Except with probability d/p , if $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ is chosen independently of $G^{(\mu)}$,

$$G^{(\mu)} \text{ is correct} \iff G^{(\mu)} \text{ opens to } g(s) = \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (1 + \alpha_{\mu+1-i}^{-1} s^{2^{i-1}})$$

Bulletproofs: Amortizing Linear Verifiers

(Atomic) Accumulator Intuition

- Suppose we want to prove a sequence of inner product statements...

CLAIM 1: $(C_1, D_1, \sigma_1) \in \mathcal{R}_{IP}$

PROOF 1: $\pi_1, G_1^{(\mu)}$

$$1 \stackrel{?}{=} \bigvee_{\text{succinct}} (C_1, D_1, \sigma_1, \pi_1, G_1^{(\mu)})$$

$$s_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

CLAIM 1': PolyCommit($G_1^{(\mu)}$) opens to

$$g(s_1) = \pi (1 + \alpha_{\mu+1-i} s_1^{2^{i-1}})$$

CLAIM 2: $(C_2, D_2, \sigma_2) \in \mathcal{R}_{IP} \wedge (G_1^{(\mu)}, g(s_1)) \in \mathcal{R}_{PC}$

PROOF: $\pi_2, G_2^{(\mu)}$



Bulletproofs: Amortizing Linear Verifiers

(Atomic) Accumulator Intuition

- Suppose we want to prove a sequence of inner product statements...

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PROOF: $\pi_2, G_2^{(\mu)}$



The linear verification “delayed” or accumulated in a fresh running instance

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